



ECCSSafe – Exploring contributions of civil society to safety

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Addressing civil society contribution to safety

- ECCSSafe : A feasibility study for a larger scale research on the contribution of civil society (CC) & local actors to the safety of industrial activities, to the safety culture and to the resilience of organisations as regards safety
- A mixed research team gathering think tank, NGO and academic research:
 - Mutadis (France) – Coordinator
 - Regional Environmental Centre for central and Eastern Europe + University of Ljubljana (Slovenia)
 - EnergiaKlub (Hungary)
- International guidelines in chemical and nuclear field acknowledge Significant contribution of civil society to safety (IAEA, OECD)
- The concept of safety culture has been thoroughly developed, but it s not the case for the contribution of CC to safety

Method

- Development of a theoretical framework and a grid of analysis for case studies:
 - Understanding of safety and nature of contribution of CC to safety
 - Definition of safety as a common good
 - Inclusiveness of governance of hazardous activities and safety
 - Role of controversies and co-framing of safety issues
 - Trust as a tool for addressing complexity
- 3 case studies
 - Dorog hazardous waste incinerator (Hungary)
 - Local partnership for siting a facility for low and intermediate activity, long-lived radioactive waste management (Slovenia)
 - Engagement of local information & surveillance commission of Fessenheim in the 3rd decennial safety visit of the nuclear power plant (France)

Dorog hazardous waste incinerator (1/2)

- Hazardous waste incinerator project initiated in 1984 in the industrial region of Dorog, built in 1985 and approved in 1991 for burning waste from the whole country
- Citizen mobilisation and protests from the beginning of the project, formation of a local NGO having local political strength
- Numerous safety issues from early 90's to 2004: illegal waste storage, respiratory diseases, problems with emissions and slag, burning of unsuitable quantities of waste, water pollution
- A change of strategy of the NGO,
 - 90's and early 2000's: massive resistance, demonstrations, law suits, ...
 - New approach based on negotiation with the incinerator management
- The local government acts as a mediator
- Agreement between incinerator and NGO. Emission data are sent to the municipality regularly. The NGO can visit the facility

Dorog hazardous waste incinerator (2/2)

- A clear contribution of civil society to safety: different investments in safety equipment made by the company since 1998.
- Pressure and opposition was necessary to push the incinerator management to change its approach
 - Constant presence of civil control is interiorized by the company
- Cooperation agreement formalises the new approach
- Change of strategy has enabled building new interpersonal relations of trust between the NGO and incinerator staff members.
- However,
 - The NGO has become knowledgeable player but judges it still lacks professional technical expertise
 - Support from national level (State & national NGOs) would be appreciated
 - Balance between negotiation & trust and other strategies is subtle. Too much proximity between the NGO and incinerator staff could damage trust.⁵

Local partnerships for low & intermediate level waste facility siting in Slovenia (1/2)

- New mixed mode approach for siting low & intermediate level waste (LILW) in Slovenia to include local public in the decision-making process, adjust to local situation & gain acceptability.
- LPs prepared in 2004-2006 then operated in 2006-2008 at local community level in 2 neighbouring towns: Krško and Brežice
- Gathers citizens, local NGOs, municipality, ARAO (radioactive waste agency)
- Role was formal (preparation of National spatial plan for LILW repository, EIA) and informal (discussions on various issues, advising municipality). Decision power in the hands of municipality
- Great variety of issues tackled (safety, environment, health, but also local development and financial compensations)
- Krško municipality was selected at the end. Brežice LP was no more supported after siting decision.

Local partnerships for LILW facility siting in Slovenia (2/2)

- Obstacles for building a shared understanding of safety: facility design not finalised at siting phase, expertise gap between expert members and local residents and insufficient empowerment of local citizens, concentration on technical aspects of safety, retrievability of waste was excluded from discussions.
- Partial success in developing local understanding of stakes associated to the siting of LILW facility.
- Safety was only one issue among others. Important time and energy dedicated to local development & financial compensations
- Differences of structure between the 2 LPs: Krško LP controlled by the municipality, Brežice LP more independent.
- Suspicion and distrust: LPs were progressively seen as essentially instrumental for both the national government and Krško municipality, suspected to have a hidden agenda to reach a decision of siting in Krško.

Engagement of Local Information Commission (CLIS) in Fessenheim nuclear reactors safety reviews (1/2)

- At the crossroads of 2 processes:
 - Engagement of the CLIS of Fessenheim in the successive safety reviews
 - Strategy of openness to society of the Institute for Radiation Protection & Nuclear Safety (IRSN) – A 4-pillar safety approach integrating civil society
- CLIS gathers elected representatives, workers of the nuclear facility, environmental NGOs & qualified personalities.
- Cooperation of the CLIS with an independent expert group (GSIEN) to perform complementary safety assessment
- 3 successive decennial safety reviews:
 - 1989: Good working relations with regulator, reluctance of the company (EDF), incomplete access to documents
 - 1999: Convention with EDF to ensure access to information & confidentiality, technical working meetings organised
 - 2009: Cooperation CLIS-GSIEN-EDF-IRSN-Nuclear safety authority (ASN). Cooperation agreement, working meetings, participation to on-site safety meetings with the ASN.

Engagement of CLIS in Fessenheim nuclear reactors safety reviews (2/2)

- Conditions for developing civil society assessment of safety created through a progressive cooperation between all actors
- Clear governance framework for 3rd safety review: 2006 Law on Transparency and nuclear safety
- Shared understanding of safety as a continuous improvement process where civil society plays a role (additional safety layer)
- Demonstration of capacities of civil society to perform a sound safety analysis with justified and nuanced conclusions
- Engagement of civil society was a quality insurance for the safety system and reinforced the transparency, trustworthiness and robustness of the safety system as a whole
- Safety issues raised were taken into account (additional monitoring)
- Converging safety assessment of ASN & IRSN / CLIS & GSIEN
- Access of CLIS to expertise : GSIEN, IRSN

Conclusions (1/2)

- Civil society can and actually contribute to safety by:
 - Stretching regulators and organisations operating hazardous facilities
 - Identifying undetected safety issues
 - Pushing to include new dimensions in safety assessment
 - Acting as an additional layer of quality insurance of the safety system
 - Contributing to improve the transparency and readability of the safety system
- This requires favourable conditions, which include:
 - Clear and legitimate governance framework, enabling cooperation without blurring roles
 - Access to expertise, including independent expertise & institutional expertise
 - Resources, Empowerment of non-expert actors
 - Technical and scientific mediation to make a link between concerns of civil society and technical actors and issues
- Civil society contribution to safety can occur even if not all these conditions are met (cf. Dorog case)

Conclusions (2/2)

- Safety requires permanent vigilance and improvement, and civil society is part of this.
 - CS has a specific role to play that is different from the one of regulators, experts and organisations operating hazardous facilities
- Safety as a common good can be a basis for cooperation between civil society, organisations operating hazardous facilities, regulators and experts.
- Favouring civil society contribution to safety is a **co-evolution process** between institutional actors, organisations operating hazardous facilities and civil society organisations
- Difference between institutions' **operational safety culture** (management-oriented) and **societal safety culture** (common set of principles, references, goals, ...)
 - Non-institutional actors do not have to share operational safety culture
 - Institutional and non-institutional actors can share societal safety culture